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Abstract
Modern large network systems normally work in cooperation and incorporate dependencies
between their components for purposes of efficiency and regulation. Such dependencies may be-
come a major risk since they can cause small scale failures to propagate throughout the system.
Thus, the dependent nodes could be a natural target for malicious attacks that aim to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Here, we consider for the first time a new type of targeted attacks that are based on
the dependency between the networks. We study strategies of attacks that range from dependency-
first to dependency-last, where a fraction 1 − p of the nodes with dependency links, or nodes
without dependency links, respectively, are initially attacked. We systematically analyze, both an-
alytically and numerically, the percolation transition of partially interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
networks, where a fraction q of the nodes in each network are dependent upon nodes the other net-
work. We find that for a broad range of dependency strength q, ‘dependency-first’ strategy, which
intuitively is expected to increase the system’s vulnerability, actually leads to a more stable sys-
tem, in terms of lower critical percolation threshold pc, compared with random attacks of the same
size. In contrast, the ‘dependency-last’ strategy leads to a more vulnerable system, i.e., higher pc,
compared with a random attack. By exploring the dynamics of the cascading failures initiated by
dependency-based attacks, we explain this counter-intuitive effect. Our results demonstrate that
the most vulnerable components in a system of interdependent networks are not necessarily the
ones that lead to the maximal immediate impact but those which initiate a cascade of failures with
maximal accumulated damage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The robustness of interdependent networks and multiplex networks has been studied exten-
sively over the past decade [1–22]. This interest stems from the realization that many real-world
network systems, especially critical infrastructure systems, are not isolated but rather intercon-
nected and interdependent upon other networks. While in normal conditions the coupling is de-
signed to improve the efficiency and regulation of the entire system, it also can become a risk
factor when the system experiences failures. A first analytical framework to analyze the effect of
interdependence between networks was provided by Buldyrev et al. [1] in 2010. They studied a
model of two random networks where the functionality of nodes in each network is interdependent
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upon the functionality of nodes in the other network. In such systems, any failed node may trigger
a cascade of failures in both networks. The resilience of the system is then represented by the size
of the functional part of the network, P∞, after a failure of a fraction 1 − p of the nodes (so p rep-
resents the remaining part of the nodes after the initial failures), yielding a percolation transition.
It was shown that the transition from a functional system, i.e., P∞ > 0, to complete collapse of the
system, i.e., P∞ = 0, is discontinuous at certain p = pc [1]. Such abrupt transition represents a
major vulnerability of the system.
A generalization of the analytical model to a case of partial dependence was proposed by Par-
shani et al. [2]. It was shown that the coupling strength between the networks, represented by the
fraction q of interdependent nodes, affects two aspects of the way the system collapses [2–4, 6–
8, 10]. First, it determines the critical threshold pc below which the system completely collapses.
Second, the coupling strength determines the nature of the transition. For strong coupling, i.e.,
a high fraction of interdependent nodes, initial failures can initiate cascading failures that yield
an abrupt collapse of the system, in the form of a first-order phase transition. Reducing the cou-
pling strength below a critical value, qc, leads to a change from an abrupt collapse to a continuous
decrease of the size of the network, in the form of a second-order phase transition.
Real-world critical infrastructures are not only subject to random failures but may also be tar-
gets of malicious attacks that aim to maximize the damage to the entire system. In order to under-
stand the vulnerabilities that arise from the coupling between network systems, models of targeted
attacks on interdependent networks have been analyzed [23–25]. For example, Huang et al. in-
vestigate the degree-based targeted attacks on fully interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks
and scale-free (SF) networks, and they found that degree-based targeted attack problems can be
mapped to random attack problems [23]. Dong et al. further studied degree-based targeted attack
in partially interdependent networks and show that there is a critical coupling strength, and when
the coupling strength is larger than the critical value, the system shows a first-order transition [24].
In another related paper, their analytical results have been generalized to several types of networks
of networks [25]. In 2017, Kleineberg et al. showed that many realistic multiplex networks are
surprisingly robust against degree-based targeted attacks, and geometric correlations have been
found to be the major reason [26].
Yet, the research of targeted attacks on interdependent networks focused on only one aspect of
the system’s vulnerability, namely, the role of the nodes within their individual network. However,
the special vulnerability of interdependent networks primarily stems from the existence of depen-
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dencies between the networks. Particularly, the cascading failures are resulted by the synergy be-
tween processes within the individual networks, represented by connectivity links between nodes
of the same network, and the interrelations between the networks, represented by dependency
links between the networks. Therefore, malicious attacks could try to exploit the vulnerability
arises from the dependency links. Indeed, attacking nodes with inter-dependencies seems to have
an obvious advantage (from the point of view of the attacker): in addition to the nodes attacked
directly, more failures will be caused due to their direct dependency relations. So far, the effect of
such targeted attacks on interdependent networks has not been investigated.
To address this critical question, we set out to systematically study the dependency-based tar-
get attack strategies on partially interdependent ER networks. These dependency-based attacks
can focus on nodes connected with dependency links, namely ‘dependency-first’ attacks, or alter-
natively avoid those nodes and focus on nodes without dependency links, that is ’dependency-last’
attacks. Using numerical simulations we analyzed the percolation transition resulted from each
strategy for different values of the coupling strength q. We find that for each strategy there is
a critical coupling strength q∗ such that for q < q∗ the resulted percolation transitions have a
counter-intuitive behavior, where the system is more robust to ’dependency-first’ attack strategies,
i.e., smaller value of the percolation threshold pc, compared with random attacks of the same size.
In contrast, ’dependency-last’ strategy results in a percolation transition with a higher value of pc
compared with a random attack. In this manuscript, we study and explain this surprising behavior.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
To study the resilience of interdependent networks, we study percolation transitions caused by
targeted attacks on nodes with dependency links. To do this, we consider two partially interde-
pendent networks A and B, where a fraction of nodes, q, in A and B have dependency links. We
assume that all the dependency links are bidirectional, and they fulfill the no-feedback condition:
a node from A or B depends on no more than one node from the other network, and if a node Ai
depends on node B j, and B j depends on Ak, then i = k [8]. The nodes with and without dependency
links are called “dependent nodes” and “non-dependent nodes”, respectively. An attacked node is
represented by removing it from the network.
We consider strategies for initial node attack that range between two opposite extremes:
‘Dependency-first’ targeted attack: a fraction 1 − p of nodes from A are selected and removed,
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FIG. 1: A schematic plot of partially interdependent networks, under three types of attacks: a) Random
attack: Nodes are attacked at random, b) Degree-based targeted attack: The order of attacked nodes is
determined by the number of connected nodes in the individual networks. c) Dependency-based targeted
attacks: In ”dependency-first” attack, nodes are attacked first if their failure will cause node in the other
network to also fail, due to dependency relations. In ”dependency-last” attack, these nodes are attacked
lastly.
where dependent nodes are randomly selected first. If (1 − p) < q, only dependent nodes will be
removed. If (1 − p) > q, all the dependency nodes will be removed and a fraction of 1 − p − q of
non-dependent nodes will be randomly removed.
‘Dependency-last’ targeted attack: a fraction 1 − p of nodes from A are selected and removed,
where non-dependent nodes are randomly selected first. If p > q, only non-dependent nodes will
be removed. If p < q, all the non-dependency nodes will be removed and a fraction of 1−p−(1−q)
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of dependent nodes will be randomly removed.
An intermediate case between these two extremes is the standard ’random-attack’. In this case,
nodes are randomly removed from both dependent and non-dependent nodes.
We define a general attack strategy with the parameter β that includes as specific cases these
two extreme attack strategies, as well as the case of a random attack. In this definition, a fraction of
1−p of nodes are initially removed, but the probability of choosing a dependent node is α times the
probability of choosing a non-dependent node, where α ≡ (1+β)/(1−β). Here, β ∈ [−1, 1] is used
as a parameter that modulates the ratio of dependent nodes in the initial attack. The cases of β = 1
and β = −1 correspond to dependency-first and dependency-last targeted attacks, respectively,
and β = 0 corresponds to a random attack. Attack strategies with a higher probability to attack
dependent nodes, i.e., 0 < β < 1, are referred to as ‘Dependency-biased’ attacks, while attacks
with a higher probability to attack non-dependent nodes, i.e., −1 < β < 0, are referred to as
‘Non-dependency-biased’ attacks.
We compare our results to the traditional ‘degree-based’ attacks, namely, ‘high-degree first’ and
‘low-degree first’ for which a fraction 1−p of nodes from A are selected and removed, where nodes
are sorted according to their degrees, and chosen one by one from the largest- or smallest-degree
nodes, respectively [23–25]. Obviously, given the very different nature of ‘degree-based’ and
‘dependency-based’ attacks, their impact on the networks is quantitatively different. For example,
attacking a single ‘hub’, instead of just a random node, can dramatically increase the immediate
damage and affect many other nodes in its network, while attacking a single ‘dependent-node’
causes additional removal of only one dependent-node in the other network. Nevertheless, by
systematic analyzing each of these attack strategies we can compare their results qualitatively.
As previously demonstrated [1, 2], any initial attack of an interdependent system may result
in a cascading process of failures, a result of the synergy between two different effects: (a) a
percolation process governed by connectivity links and (b) the failure of dependent-nodes due to
a failure of their related nodes in the other network. Eventually, the cascade can either fade out,
leaving a functional part of the system or alternatively, leads to complete fragmentation of the
entire system. We define the size of the final largest connected component of network A as P∞,
and we study how P∞ changes with p for different values of q. We also denote the size of the
second-largest component of A at the end of the cascading process as P∞2.
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III. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENCY-BASED ATTACKS
Here we present a step-by-step analytical approach for the percolation of partially interdepen-
dent networks under dependency-based targeted attacks. This can be regarded as an extension of
the analytical results shown in a previous work regarding random attack [2].
A. ‘Dependency-first’ attack
We first focus on the dependency-first attack (β = 1). After randomly attacking a fraction
1 − p of nodes (dependency-nodes are chosen first) in A, there are two cases: the fraction q of
dependency-nodes are all removed, or not, depending on if q > 1 − p. For either cases, we denote
the fraction of remaining nodes in A as P′1 = p, and the remaining network as A
′
1. Note that,
immediately after the initial attack, the fraction of dependency nodes becomes
q′1 =

q−(1−p)
p , q > 1 − p,
0, q ≤ 1 − p
(1)
Due to the initial random attack, some more nodes in A will fail due to percolation. The remaining
size of the giant component in network A at time step t = 1 is P1 = P′1gA(P
′
1) (denoted as network
A1). In fact, for the nodes in network A that do not belong the giant component (totally (1−P1) ·N
nodes), only a fraction q1 of them have dependency links, where q1 =
min(q,1−p)+(p−P1)q′1
1−P1 . Therefore,
the fraction of nodes in B that fail due to inter-dependency is q1 · (1 − P1) = q1 · (1 − P′1gA(P′1)).
We denote the remaining fraction of nodes in B is Q′1 = 1 − q1(1 − pgA(P′1)). This remaining
network is B′1. After that, due to percolation, the remaining giant component size in network B is
Q1 = Q′1gB(Q
′
1) (denoted as network B1).
At time step t = 2, q′2 · (Q′1 − Q1) · N more nodes in A1 will fail due to interdependency, where
Q′1 − Q1 is the fraction of percolation failures in B at t = 1, and q′2 = q−(1−Q
′
1)
Q′1
is the fraction of
dependency nodes in B after attacking a fraction 1 − Q′1 of nodes on B. Therefore, the fraction
of nodes in network A1 that will be removed is
q′2
P1
· (Q′1 − Q1). This is equivalent to randomly
remove the same fraction of nodes from network A′1. Thus, the total fraction of random attack
from network A is p · q′2P1 · (Q′1 −Q1) + (1− p) = 1− p(1−q′1(1−gB(Q′1))). Therefore, the remaining
fraction of nodes in A after this attack is P′2 = p(1− q′1(1− gB(Q′1))), and the giant component size
in A at t = 2 is P2 = P′2gA(P
′
2). Following this approach, we can obtain that at t = 2 the remaining
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fraction of nodes in B after the equivalent random attack is Q′2 = p(1− q′1(1− gA(P′2))). After that,
due to percolation, the remaining giant component size in network B is Q2 = Q′2gB(Q
′
2).
In this way, we can obtain a general form for the giant component sizes of A and B at time step
t with t ≥ 2:
P′t = p(1 − q′1(1 − gB(Q′t−1))), Pt = P′tgA(P′t),
Q′t = p(1 − q′1(1 − gA(P′t))), Qt = Q′tgB(Q′t).
(2)
At the end of the cascading process, where t → ∞, we have P′t+1 = P′t , and Q′t+1 = Q′t . We denote
x = P′t , and y = Q
′
t at the end of the process, then we obtain a system of equations about x and y:
x = p(1 − q′1(1 − gB(y))), and y = p(1 − q′1(1 − gA(x))).
Here, the functions gA(x) and gB(y) can be obtained through a widely-used generating func-
tion approach [1, 2]. We denote the generating function of degree distribution of networks A as
GA0(ξ) =
∑
k PA(k)ξk. We also define the generating function of the underlying branching pro-
cesses as GA1(ξ) = G′A0(ξ)/G
′
A0(1). The fraction of nodes in the giant component after randomly
removing 1− p nodes from A will be pA(p) = 1−GA0(1− p(1− fA)), where fA can be solved from
fA = GA1(1−p(1− fA)) [1, 2]. For an ER network A, we know thatGA1(ξ) = GA0(ξ) = exp(a(ξ−1)),
where a is the mean degree of network A. Therefore, the equations about x and y become:
x = p(1 − q′1 fB),
y = p(1 − q′1 fA),
(3)
where fA = exp(−ax(1− fA)) and fB = exp(−bx(1− fB)). Finally, by substitute x and y into Eq. (3),
we have 
fA = e−ap(1− fA)(1−q
′
1 fB),
fB = e−bp(1−q
′
1 fA)(1− fB),
(4)
By solving this system of equations, we can obtain fA and fB for given p and q values. After
that, the size of the giant component in A and B are P∞ = xgA(x) = p(1 − fA)(1 − q′1 fB), and
Q∞ = ygB(y) = p(1 − q′1 fA)(1 − fB), respectively.
To obtain the analytical results of the transition point pc and the type of the transition, we can
rewrite the equations of fA and fB as
fA = fA( fB) = 1q′1
(
1 − −ln( fB)bp(1− fB)
)
,
fB = fB( fA) = 1q′1
(
1 − −ln( fA)ap(1− fA)
)
.
(5)
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By solving Eq. (5) together with d fA( fB)d fB ·
d fB( fA)
d fA
= 1, we can obtain the value of pc for the first order
percolation transition, where the two curves fA = fA( fB) and fB = fB( fA) become tangent at a point
of ( fA, fB) with 0 < fA < 1 and 0 < fB < 1. On the other hand, By solving Eq. (5) and fA = 1 (or
fB = 1), we can find the transition point pc for the second order transition.
In this way, the cascading process of failures, the final giant component size P∞ and Q∞, as
well as the critical point pc can be solved numerically using the above approach.
B. ‘Dependency-last’ attack
Here we show the analytical results for the dependency-last attack (β = −1). As in the case of
dependency-first attack, at t = 1, a fraction 1 − p of nodes in A are initially removed. The fraction
of remaining nodes is P′1 = p, and then the giant component size in A is P1 = P
′
1gA(P
′
1).
Here we use a similar approach to the case with β = 1 to find the equivalent amount of random
attack and the giant component size at each time step t. For dependency-last attack, the expressions
of q′1 and q1 will be different with those for β = 1. Here we can find that
q′1 = 1, q1 =
q−P1
1−P1 , q > p,
q′1 = q/p, q1 =
(p−P1)q′1
1−P1 , q ≤ p.
(6)
For network B at t = 1, we have Q′1 = 1 − q1(1 − pgA(P′1)), and Q1 = Q′1gB(Q′1).
After that, at time step t ≥ 2, we can obtain:
P′t = p(1 − q′1(1 − gB(Q′t−1))), Pt = P′tgA(P′t), (7)
Q′t =

1 − q + pgA(P′t), q > p,
1 − pq′1(1 − gA(P′t)), q ≤ p,
Qt = Q′tgB(Q
′
t). (8)
Based on these equations, we can write the equations of x and y at t = ∞: for q > p,
x = p(1 − q′1(1 − gB(y))),
y = 1 − q + pgA(x),
(9)
and for q ≤ p, 
x = p(1 − q′1(1 − gB(y))),
y = 1 − pq′1(1 − gA(x)).
(10)
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These equations can be transformed into equations of fA = 1 − gA(x) and fB = 1 − gB(y): for
q > p, 
fA = e−ap(1− fA)(1− fB),
fB = e−b(1−q+p(1− fA))(1− fB).
(11)
For q ≤ p, we can obtain similarly, 
fA = e−ap(1− fA)(1−
q
p fB),
fB = e−b(1−q fA))(1− fB).
(12)
As we have done for the dependency-first attack (β = 1), for each of these cases here, we
can express the equations as fA = fA( fB), and fB = fB( fA), and solve the percolation transition
point pc numerically. Based on these results, we can also calculate the giant component size
P∞ = xgA(x) = p(1 − fA)(1 − q′1 fB), and
Q∞ = ygB(y) =

(1 − q + p(1 − fA))(1 − fB), q > p,
(1 − pq′1 fA)(1 − fB), q ≤ p,
(13)
for given p and q values for the dependency-last attack.
IV. RESULTS
A. Percolation transition due to dependency-based attacks
In this subsection, we present analytical and simulation results of dependency-based targeted
attacks on a pair of partially interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks. In the simulations, each
network consists of 3×105 nodes with equal mean degree in both networks kA = kB = 4. A random
fraction q of the nodes in each network are dependent upon random nodes of the other network via
bidirectional dependency links (as explained above).
To study the stability of interdependent networks against dependency-based attacks we analyze
the percolation transition for different attack strategies. The transition is commonly represented by
the percolation threshold pc, and the type of the percolation transition is classified as continuous
or abrupt [2]. The analytical derivation of pc is given by Eq. (5), as shown above in Sec. III A. The
numerical analysis is demonstrated in Fig. 2 for the extreme cases of ’Dependency-first’ (β = 1),
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FIG. 2: Percolation transition of partially interdependent ER networks (kA = kB = 4) under targeted attacks.
Three levels of dependency strength are shown: (a) q = 0.9, (b) q = 0.8, and (c) q = 0.6. Upper panels: The
size of network A at steady state, P∞, after an initial attack of (1−p) of the nodes is shown versus the fraction
of the remaining nodes p. Random attack (β = 0, black) is compared with ’dependency-first’ (β = 1, red)
and ’dependency-last’ (β = −1, blue). Circles and solid lines represent the simulation and analytical results,
respectively. Middle and lower panels show simulation results of the second-largest component of network
A, P∞2, and the number of iterations in the cascade (NOI), respectively, versus p. The numerical results
represent single realization of interdependent networks, each with N = 106 nodes.
’Dependency-last’ (β = −1) and a random attack (β = 0). At the transition point pc, the size of
the largest connected component of network A, P∞, changes from zero to non-zero (Fig. 2, top
panels). In the case of a continues transition, i.e., the size of the largest-component at criticality is
zero, the size of the second-largest component peaks as p approaches pc, as in regular percolation
in a single network (Fig. 2, middle panels) [27, 28]. The case of abrupt transition, i.e., the size
of the network at criticality is larger than zero, is characterized by a sharp peak in the number-
of-iterations (NOI) in the cascade (Fig. 2, bottom panels) [6, 29]. The simulations results are in
agreement with the analytical predictions.
As demonstrated in Fig. 2, the response of an interdependent system to an dependency-based
targeted attack is dramatically affected by the coupling strength q. In the case of strong depen-
dency, q = 0.9, the system is more susceptible to ’dependency-first’ attack strategy compared with
’dependency-last’ attack, yielding higher percolation threshold pc (Fig. 2(a)). However, for weaker
dependency strength q = 0.8, pc is roughly the same in both attack strategies (Fig. 2(b)), while in
weak coupling q = 0.6 the system becomes more susceptible to ’dependency-last’ compared with
’dependency-first’ (Fig. 2(c)). In all cases, the random strategy represents the intermediate case
between the two extreme cases.
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To study the role of the dependency strength in determining the stability of interdependent
networks against dependency-based attacks, we systematically analyze the percolation threshold
for different attack strategies for various values of coupling strength q. In Fig. 3(a), we show pc
as a function of q for dependency-based attacks with β = ±1,±2/3,±1/3, as well as for random
attacks (β = 0). There is a general trend common for all attack strategies. Increasing the coupling
strength leads to higher pc, and the transition type change from continuous transition to abrupt
transition, as previously shown for random attack [2]. In respect to this trend, Fig. 3(c) compares
the transition due to each of the different dependency-based attack strategies with the transition due
to random attack over the same number of nodes. We find that for each of the ’dependency-biased’
attack strategies (β > 0), there is coupling strength q∗(β), such that for q > q∗(β) the critical threshold
pc is higher than random, while for q < q∗(β), the critical threshold pc is lower. In contrast, for
the ’non-dependency-biased’ attack strategies (β < 0), for q > q∗(β) the critical threshold pc is
lower than random, while for q < q∗(β), the critical threshold pc becomes higher than for the case
of random attack. As explained above, this is the result of the effective change in the dependency
strength after ’dependency-based’ attacks.
In contrast, the effect of ’degree-based’ attacks that target nodes based on the number of neigh-
bors within each network is qualitatively the same for all dependency strengths. As shown in
Figs. 3(b) and 3(d), pc of ’high-degree-first’ is higher compared with random and pc of ’high-
degree-first’ is lower compared with random, for any value of dependency strength q.
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FIG. 3: The effect of coupling strength q on the stability of interdependent networks under dependency-
based and degree-based attacks. (a) Numerical results of pc versus q, for partially interdependent ER
networks (kA = kB = 4), each with N = 3 × 105 nodes. Results represent an average over 10 realizations.
Random attack (black) is compared with dependency-first (β = 1, red) and dependency-last (β = −1, blue)
targeted attacks. Solid lines and dashed lines indicate first order and second order transitions, respectively,
for each curve. Grey lines represent four intermediate cases β = ±1/3, β = ±2/3 (grey lines). The red
dashed line corresponds to the region where all dependency nodes are initially attacked. (b) The same as
(a) for the cases of high-degree first (red) and low-degree first (blue) targeted attacks. The ratio between
the critical threshold pc of each of the attacks and the one for same size random attack, pc/pc,random, (c) for
dependency-based attacks and (d) for degree-based attacks.
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FIG. 4: (a) The ratio between the giant component size of A under dependency-first attack (β = 1) and
that under random attack, Pt/Pt,random VS t, analytical results. Partially interdependent ER networks. Here
kA = kB = 4, q changes from 0.76 to 0.82, and p is taken as the critical value pc in theory. (b) The same as
(a), but for the dependency-last attack (β = −1).
B. The special cascading dynamics due to dependency-based attacks
In order to understand the counter-intuitive effect of the dependency strength in dependency-
based targeted attacks (shown in Fig.3), we explore the dynamics of the cascading process near
q∗(β). Figure 4(a) shows, for each step of the cascade, the ratio between the sizes of network A
under dependency-first attack and under same-size-random-attack, Pt/Pt,random, calculated from
Eq.(2). As shown in Fig. 3(c), for the case of β = 1 the crossover is at q∗(β=1) ≈ 0.79. Accordingly,
in Fig. 4(a) we show the cascading process of models with values of q ranging from 0.76 to 0.82,
where for each model the initial attack size, (1 − pβ=1), is chosen as the critical value for the
random attack, i.e., pβ=1 = pβ=0c , as detailed in the figure legend. In the case of q > q∗(β=1), i.e.,
q = 0.80 and q = 0.82, the sequence of Pt/Pt,random monotonically decreases. This behavior is
rather intuitive since a dependency-first attack causes an increased immediate damage compared
with a random attack, which in turn leads to a series of larger failures and eventually a complete
collapse of the system. However, for q < q∗(β), i.e., q = 0.76 and q = 0.78, the sequence of
Pt/Pt,random is non-monotonic. The immediate damage right after the initial attack is indeed larger
than random, that is, Pt/Pt,random < 1, but the following cascading failures become smaller than
random until eventually the system reaches a steady state with a network size which is larger than
same-size-random-attack, P∞/P∞,random > 1.
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Similarly, in the case of dependency-last attacks (β = −1) the dynamics of the cascading fail-
ures dramatically change for different coupling strengths, as shown in Fig. 4(b). In contrast with
dependency-first attacks, the initial impact of dependency-last attacks is smaller than random fail-
ures, yielding larger network size (P∞/P∞,random > 1) right after the initial attack. This is expected,
as the attack is focus mainly on non-dependent nodes. However, in the cases where q < q∗(β)
(q = 0.72 and q = 0.74) the damage in each step of the cascade gradually increases until the
system completely collapses.
These counter-intuitive behaviors stem from the role the dependency links play throughout
the process. In the case of ’dependency-first’ attack, the immediate impact is indeed larger than
random failures, However, in the long term, removing the dependent nodes also decreases the
coupling between the networks leading to suppressed propagation of the damages. As an extreme
example, attacking all the dependent nodes at the initial step, i.e., ’dependency-first’ attack with
1 − p = q, will cause large immediate damage but no additional cascading failures. In contrast,
’dependency-last’ attacks minimize the immediate failures but effectively increases the coupling
between the networks in the following steps. These results suggest that the effective coupling
strength during the process of the cascading failures may have a crucial role in determining the
overall resilience of the system.
V. CONCLUSION
In summarize, we analytically and numerically investigated the percolation transitions in par-
tially interdependent ER networks under targeted attack based on dependency links. We show that
a counter-intuitive vulnerability arises due to the role the dependency links play throughout the
cascading process, where for a wide range of dependency strength, an attack strategy that avoids
the dependent nodes may lead to more damage compared with an attack that focuses on them. A
general conclusion from these results is that the effect of dependency-based targeted attacks should
not be considered solely by their immediate impact but the evolving process of cascading failures
should be taken into account.
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